The two big issues on Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda during his first term concerned nuclear proliferation. He could not have handled them more differently. In the first case, North Korea had an active programme to develop weapons, which Barack Obama had sought to curtail but had been unsuccessful. Trump attempted to succeed where Obama failed through direct negotiation. The second case involved Iran. After long negotiations involving Russia and European countries, Obama agreed a deal in 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to limit Iran’s nuclear programme by restricting the amount of uranium it could enrich. Trump decided this had to be a bad deal, if only because Obama had negotiated it, so he abandoned it to show that he could do better. In both cases, the nuclear programmes were less restrained at the end of his first term than they had been at the start.
The personal effort Trump put into reversing North Korea’s nuclear programme was extraordinary, and at times embarrassing. He began, in 2017, with a vicious war of words with Kim Jong Un over North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile tests, threatening “fire and fury”. But when there was a possibility of a summit with Kim the following year, Trump accepted with alacrity. The North Korean leader was delighted to meet with the president of the United States on equal terms.
For his part, Trump found something appealing about the young tyrant. He spoke of his attachment to Kim in terms more appropriate for a teenage romance. Their first meeting in Singapore generated great excitement but the episode demonstrated all the hallmarks of Trump’s diplomacy: a delusional belief in his own deal-making powers; a belief that his interlocutor was as committed to a deal as he was, and a wilful neglect of messy details. There was never much chance that Kim would agree to dismantle the only asset that gave him any international standing. No substantive progress was made. North Korea is now assessed to have some 50 weapons and material for many more. Since he returned to office, Trump has barely mentioned the issue, although he has observed wistfully of Kim, “He liked me. I liked him. We got along very well.”
There was some basis to Trump’s complaints about Obama’s deal with Iran: it did not last long enough, did not include Iran’s missile programme, and not only gave it cover to continue with regional subversion but also, via sanctions relief, provided the resources to do so. Nonetheless, in the JCPOA there was a commitment that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons”. Iran was allowed to enrich uranium only to a maximum of 3.67 per cent, below what is needed for most peaceful purposes, and substantially below the 90 per cent level required for weapons. Iran reduced the number of its uranium-enrichment centrifuges to about 6,000 – down from 19,000 – and agreed to inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
After walking away from the JCPOA in 2018, Trump adopted a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran, complete with harsh economic sanctions. His proposals for a better deal involved not only tougher terms on enrichment but virtual regime change in Tehran, an end to its support of radical groups across the region and greater restrictions on its missile as well as nuclear programme. Unsurprisingly none of this led to new talks with Tehran. Iran began to open up more centrifuges and enrich more uranium to even higher levels. As sanctions began to bite in 2019, Iran is believed to have lashed out, attacking tankers and, through its Yemeni Houthi proxies, facilities in Saudi Arabia. At the start of 2020, Trump struck a real blow against the Iranian regime when he approved the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who was responsible for Iranian overseas operations. This followed attacks by Iranian proxies on US bases in Iraq.
During the Biden interregnum there were talks, but there was too much else going on in the world. So long as there was a prospect of Trump returning to power and abandoning a deal once more, the Iranians did not see much point. As a result, Trump returned to the White House this year with Iran close to having sufficient material for its first weapon. A new IAEA report found that Iran’s stock of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent is enough, if enriched further, to make nine nuclear weapons.
There is also a deadline. Under the UN Security Council Resolution, if there is no further deal by 18 October 2025, the three European signatories – Britain, France and Germany – can invoke a “snapback” mechanism that would enable them to reintroduce the sanctions that were lifted while the JCPOA was in effect. Iran has warned that if this happens, it will leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a clear signal that it was moving to weaponisation.
Why is progress even possible after Trump’s first term? Most importantly, Iran is much weaker. Its economy is in a dire state, suffering from sanctions and mismanagement. Now the oil price is sliding. The regime’s regional standing was diminished after its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, were left battered by Israel, while Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, which it had done so much to support, collapsed in late 2024. Its Iraqi proxies have largely held their fire. Only the Houthis in Yemen have demonstrated resilience and continued effectiveness, and they have reached their own ceasefire with Trump. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is ailing, and the clerical hardliners are being held back by concerns about a popular revolt. President Masoud Pezeshkian has made clear his desire for improved relations with the West.
The Arab states that once pushed Trump to take a tough stance are far more relaxed. They no longer find Iran so threatening. Moreover, when Trump held back from responding after the 2019 Houthi attack on facilities of Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil and gas company, Aramco, they concluded that they could not be sure that the US would go to war on their behalf. They subsequently worked to improve their relations with Iran. The Saudis prefer Trump to Biden, as he does not nag them about human rights and is happy to sell them arms without pushing normalisation with Israel, but, as his recent visit to the Gulf demonstrated, the priorities now are more about economics than politics.
Now it is Israel that is most anxious. Benjamin Netanyahu wants Trump to stay close to the belligerence of his first term. But Netanyahu’s influence shrinks as Trump (along with all other Western leaders) distances himself from Israel’s calamitous war in Gaza. There are occasional reports of Israel preparing military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but this would be a high-risk venture, requiring many sorties and would probably be beyond Israel’s capabilities without substantial US support. Trump has reportedly told Netanyahu that he wants to resolve the issues with Iran diplomatically and would not welcome any Israeli escalation while he seeks to do so.
[See also: Trump has tired of Netanyahu]
Trump is unlikely to get a better deal than the JCPOA, but there will be little domestic pushback if a lesser agreement is reached and the issue is taken off the foreign policy agenda, at least for now. Critics of JCPOA, and now of Trump’s negotiations, have argued that the only certain way of stopping Iran’s nuclear programme is through military action. Iran has done what it can through dispersing and hardening key facilities, and deploying air defences, to make this as hard as possible. It would take many strikes over an extended period to seriously degrade these capabilities, with a high risk of another Middle Eastern war. The Pentagon is concentrating on preparations for conflict with China, and there is little appetite to use up ordnance trying to get at Iran’s underground enrichment facilities if a deal, however unsatisfactory, is available as a face-saving alternative.
Nonetheless, Trump still has a problem with the likely gap between what he claims to expect from a deal and what he can get. In 2003, Libya agreed to the complete dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities and Israel has spoken of this as the only appropriate model for Iran. The subsequent fate of Muammar al-Gaddafi, the Libyan leader killed during a Western-backed rebellion in 2011, will not inspire others to follow this example. At times both Trump and his special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, have ruled out the continuation of any enrichment capability. At other times they have hinted at compromises, with perhaps some permitted to continue under strict oversight. There have been proposals for a regional enrichment facility, which could be shared by other countries with civil nuclear power programmes.
Yet for Iran this is a red line. Khamenei rejected demands to stop enriching uranium as “excessive and outrageous”. Its foreign minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X prior to the latest round of talks: “Zero nuclear weapons = we DO have a deal. Zero enrichment = we do NOT have a deal.” The Iranian position has been that they have no intention of building nuclear weapons, so it is therefore in principle no big deal to promise once again not to do so. But they seem prepared to allow for more intrusive inspection of relevant facilities. Their language also allows for the possibility of some return to the sort of limits on enrichment they had agreed under JCPOA, so long as some enrichment continues. In return they will want assurances that the Americans will honour the deal, as well as substantial relief from sanctions. Iran is trying to make a deal even more attractive to Trump by playing on the president’s belief that political deals can unlock great economic riches.
Reports suggest that the US has made a detailed proposal to Iran as “preliminary ideas” for discussion. This would allow it to continue limited low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil for an unspecified period. But the enrichment concentration must be reduced to 3 per cent and any enrichment activity be above ground. Also, Iran would be prohibited from building any new enrichment facilities and required to “dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium”, and halt all new research on centrifuges. The idea of a regional enrichment consortium is also raised. All this must be subject to a “strong system for monitoring and verification”. Only once a real commitment has been shown will there be sanctions relief. Other reports describe Iran’s assessment that this deserves rejection, although they are more likely to respond with counter-proposals. There are other indications that a more generous programme of sanctions relief might encourage a more positive response.
Israel and Congressional critics will note that thus far there are no signs of any agreements covering Iran’s missile programme or support of radical groups in the region. Arab states would like Iran to commit to refraining from interfering in their domestic affairs. Of more interest to Trump, and certainly Europe, is Iran’s role as a leading weapons supplier to Russia, providing the drones and missiles that have been striking Ukrainian cities, and as an active economic partner with China. Getting Iran to agree to a reset in its foreign policy for the sake of a nuclear deal and sanctions relief would be optimistic. Yet if the Trump administration does not try, it would be seen by its critics to be as much of a failure as allowing Iran, which is on the verge of becoming a nuclear weapons state, to continue with uranium enrichment. Trump’s boast that he could get a better deal than JCPOA is unlikely to be realised. But the issue he now faces is whether some deal is better than leaving Iran unconstrained or authorising substantial military strikes with uncertain outcomes.
[See also: Neil Kinnock: My plan to Trump-proof Britain]
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This article appears in the 04 Jun 2025 issue of the New Statesman, The Housing Trap